The impacts of Three Strikes on crime in California and throughout the U.S. are analyzed using cross-sectional time series analysis of state-level data from 1986 to 2005. The model measures both deterrence and incapacitation effects, controlling for pre-existing crime trends and economic, demographic, and policy factors. Despite limited usage outside California, the presence of a Three Strikes law appears to be associated with slightly but significantly faster rates of decline in robbery, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft nationwide. Three Strikes is also associated with slower declines in murder rates. Although California's law is the broadest and most-frequently-used Three Strikes policy, it has not produced greater incapacitation effects on crime than other states' far more limited laws. The analyses indicate that the "toughest" sentencing policy is not necessarily the most effective option.
The simple before-and-after comparisons used by these advocates and critics of the law are easy to comprehend but lack methodological rigor. They fail to account for important factors, such as the fact that crime rates had begun to decline before Three Strikes was introduced, and they omit other key variables that influence crime rates.
More sophisticated analyses have been conducted by academic researchers, producing a wide range of conclusions. Employing a two-stage least squares model to analyze California county-level panel data from 1983 through 1996, Shepherd (2002b) concludes that the two-and three-strikes provisions of California's law resulted in significant deterrent effects on murder, assault, robbery, and burglary rates.
2 In contrast, other scholarly studies, using various data sources and methodologies, find that the law's impacts on crime have been modest (Stolzenberg & D'Alessio, 1997; Zimring, Kamin, & Hawkins, 1999) , nonexistent or undetectable (Austin et al., 1999; Beres & Griffith, 1998; Males et al., 1999) , or even counterproductive. Some researchers have concluded that the laws have resulted in an increase in homicides as offenders facing strikes sentences seek to evade law enforcement authorities or eliminate witnesses (Kovandzic, Sloan, & Vieraitis, 2002 Marvell & Moody, 2001) . Studies also link Three Strikes to other actual or predicted unintended consequences, such as strain on local law enforcement operations, jail systems, and courts (Austin, 1994; Austin et al., 1999; California Youth and Adult Correctional Agency -Board of Corrections, 1996) , prison overcrowding and increased rates of release from prison (Dickey, 1996 (Dickey, , 1998 , and escalating costs in the long-term as affected prisoners grow older and require more expensive care (Auerhahn, 1999 (Auerhahn, , 2002 R. S. King & Mauer, 2001; Schmertmann, Amankwaa, & Long, 1998) . Finally, some scholars have pointed out that mandatory sentences like Three Strikes have led to tremendous social costs, such as those associated with mass incarceration of offenders and their eventual re-entry to society (Mauer & Chesney-Lind, 2002; Travis, 2002; Travis & Waul, 2003) .
Several reports completed in the 1990s and early 2000s include the caveat that sufficient data to measure the law's full impacts on crime might not be available for several years, particularly because the incapacitation effects associated with lengthy mandatory sentences would only be observed after affected offenders completed the sentences they would already have faced in the law's absence (Austin et al., 1999; Greenwood et al., 1994 ; J. R. Ramirez & Crano, 2003) . Now that more than a decade has passed since the law's adoption, sufficient postimplementation data exist to conduct more rigorous analyses. Ramirez and Crano (2003) use
ARIMA and regression models to analyze monthly statewide crime and arrest data from
California for the years 1983 to 1998. Controlling for pre-existing crime trends, they detect few immediate impacts of Three Strikes, some deterrence and incapacitation effects over time for violent and premeditated "instrumental" offenses and for "minor" crimes not targeted by Three
Strikes, and no impacts on drug offenses. Worrall's 2004 study uses a cross-sectional time series model with fixed effects for years and counties to examine Three Strikes' effects using data on California's counties from 1989 to 2000. In contrast to Ramirez and Crano (2003) , Worrall's investigation finds that the law has "virtually no deterrent or incapacitative effects on serious crime" once county fixed effects are taken into account (Worrall, 2004) . Kovandzic, Sloan, and Vieratis (2002, 2004) apply cross-sectional time series analysis to data for 188 cities in the United States from 1980 to 2000. In their 2004 study, the authors find that while significant declines in crime trends could be found for some offenses in some states in the aftermath of Three Strikes' adoption, significant increases could be found in roughly the same number of states, suggesting either that the findings were either random statistical artifacts or that the law has both positive and negative impacts that cancel each other out on the whole (Kovandzic et al., 2004) . The only exception to this finding was for rates of homicide, for which more significant increases than declines were found (Kovandzic et al., 2004) .
Contributions of the Present Study to the Literature
This paper examines the effects of Three Strikes on crime not only in California, but also throughout the nation, using state-level data for all fifty states. The methods used in this paper are similar to those used in some of the more methodologically sophisticated recent studies (e.g. 
Comparison of Three Strikes Statutes in California and Other States
"Three Strikes and You're Out" and other habitual offender mandatory sentencing laws exist in half of the American states. The laws and the years in which they were adopted are summarized in Table 1 below.
[ Table 1 about here]
While Three Strikes laws have punishment and deterrence among their goals, these policies are also based, in part, on the idea that a small proportion of habitual offenders commit most crimes, and that incarcerating the most active and incorrigible criminals will therefore dramatically improve public safety. 3 "Selective incapacitation," as this approach has been called, seeks to target the most dangerous offenders and design sentencing policies to incarcerate them during their most crime-prone years (Auerhahn, 1999 (Auerhahn, , 2003 Gottfredson & Gottfredson, 1994; Greenwood & Abrahamse, 1982) . Policymakers have not reached a consensus among regarding the most effective approach to selective incapacitation. The number of offenses that trigger a "strike" charge, the categories of crimes that count as strikes, and the sentences mandated upon conviction vary from state to state (Caulkins, 2001; Clark et al., 1997 ).
California's version of the law differs markedly from statutes adopted elsewhere.
California's Three Strikes policy consists of two primary components. First, if a defendant has a prior serious or violent felony conviction (i.e. "strike") and is convicted of any subsequent felony, the sentence for the current felony is automatically doubled (Legislative Analyst's Office, 2005) . This is often referred to as the "second strike" provision. Second, if a defendant has two or more strikes, any subsequent felony conviction carries a mandatory "third strike" sentence of twenty-five years to life in prison (Legislative Analyst's Office, 2005) . In California, twenty-one violent felonies, listed in California penal code section 667.5(c), and forty-two serious felony offenses, attempted offenses, or enhancements, listed in California penal code section 1192.7(c) (with some overlap between these two groups), can count as strikes. The law requires a state prison term (rather than jail or probation), restricts "good time" credits to twenty percent, and prohibits plea bargaining. The key difference between California and other states is that the offender's current crime need not be serious or violent. About five hundred different felony offenses can set the second-or third-strike provisions of the law into motion (Moore, 1999) .
By August 1998, California had sentenced had 40,511 offenders, including 36,043
second-strikers, under the law (Dickey, 1998) . In comparison, Washington, the first state to pass a Three Strikes statute, had sentenced approximately 120 third-strike offenders and three secondstrike offenders under its more restrictive law (Dickey, 1998) . Most other states and the federal system had sentenced even fewer prisoners (Gatland, 1998; McMurry, 1997) . The relatively narrow Three Strikes laws in most jurisdictions limit strikes-eligible offenses to a small number of violent felonies, and require three violent convictions to trigger a mandatory sentence. In some states, the law can be set into motion by more or fewer strikes. Maryland's law, for example, mandates life without parole when an offender accrues four strikes from a short list of violent felonies, and requires that separate prison terms were served for the first three offenses (Clark et al., 1997 ). Georgia's law stipulates life without parole after the second violent felony conviction from a list of specified offenses. However, far fewer offenses are covered by Georgia's law than by California's (Clark et al., 1997 (Furillo, 2004; Lundstrom, 2004; Walters, 2004) .
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Because of the tremendous difference in scope and scale, one might expect California's law to influence crime rates differently than Three Strikes laws in other states. Most research has focused on impacts in California (Auerhahn, 2002 (Auerhahn, , 2003 Greenwood et al., 1994; J. R. Ramirez & Crano, 2003; Shepherd, 2002; Stolzenberg & D'Alessio, 1997; Walsh, 1999; Worrall, 2004) .
The analysis in this paper examines the effects of Three Strikes legislation in California as well as in the rest of the nation, but the statistical models are designed to treat California's Three
Strikes policy as distinct from the policies in other states.
Hypothesis
The primary purpose of the analyses that follow is to determine whether Three Strikes laws have had significantly greater effects on crime in California than elsewhere in the United
States. Because California's law affects many more criminals than the law in any other state, the 11 The unusual breadth of the law may be due in part to the fact that it was originally passed as a ballot initiative. As such, it did not have to withstand the same formal review or fiscal scrutiny that a bill proposed by the Legislature would have undergone. The language of the ballot initiative was drafted not by a professional policymaker, but rather by an irate citizen, grieving over the murder of his daughter, and the public's support for the law was fueled in part by widespread fear and anger over the well-publicized murder of another young girl, Polly Klaas, by a remorseless repeat offender (Moore, 1999) .
12 Because the Three Strikes law was passed as a ballot initiative before a nearly identical bill was passed by the legislature, it can only be repealed or modified by means of a subsequent ballot initiative.
impacts of Three Strikes in California on crime rates are expected to be greater than the effects on the de minimis laws in place in most other states that have any such law. The infrequentlyapplied laws in states other than California are not expected to reduce crime via either deterrence or incapacitation.
Data and Methodology
The unit of observation in the analyses in this paper is the state-year. The data are measured at the state level, and the dataset covers all fifty American states for each of the seventeen years from 1986 through 2005, for a total of one thousand observations. State-level data are substantively appropriate to the task at hand. Three Strikes laws are adopted at the state level of government, and this paper seeks to assess the effects of the law's presence or absence across multiple states. County-to-county heterogeneity in Three Strikes usage exists within the state of California because district attorneys and judges exercise discretion in their implementation of the law (Walsh, 1999; Zimring, Hawkins, & Kamin, 2001 ), but most states other than California have applied the law so infrequently that an analysis at a lower level of aggregation would not be practical or meaningful. Thus, studies that rely on county-level data are generally limited to examining the effects of Three Strikes in California. A second benefit of state-level data is availability. Time series are available for all of the relevant crime data, multiple measures of economic well-being, demographic statistics including race/ethnicity and age, and budget statistics for all fifty states.
There do exist drawbacks to using state-level data. When city, county, state, or countrylevel data are used, aggregation bias becomes a concern. Heterogeneity among units is "washed out" when data are combined into average values (Spelman, 2005; Trumbull, 1989) . In addition, aggregate data may result in biased inferences if information loss is nonrandom (G. King, 1997).
For example, intentional or unintentional underreporting of crime incidents by certain local police departments, or underreporting of certain types of crimes by individual victims, may lead to county or state-level data that produce biased, sometimes inflated, estimates of deterrent effects (Cherry, 1999; Trumbull, 1989; Worrall & Pratt, 2004) . Unfortunately, limitations like these are inherent in studies that rely on aggregate data. Despite the potential shortcomings of state-level data, this level of aggregation is appropriate for the nationwide analysis in this paper.
The law has been adopted at the state level, and outside of California, with the exception of only a handful of states that have applied the law to more than a dozen offenders a year, little variance in the number of Three Strikes cases can be found between units smaller than the state, as the number of inmates affected by the law in nearly every county in most years has been zero or close to zero.
Dependent Variables
The analyses that follow examine the impacts of Three Strikes policies on the seven individual crime categories reported annually by local law enforcement agencies to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. They are (1) murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, (2) forcible rape, (3) robbery, (4) aggravated assault, (5) burglary, (6) larceny-theft, and (7) motor vehicle theft.
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Among these seven offenses, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft can be described as primarily "instrumental crimes" (J. R. Ramirez & Crano, 2003) . These offenses, committed for material gain, are likely to involve advance planning or decision-making, while violent offenses, such as homicide, rape, or aggravated assault, are more likely to be committed out of anger or passion. Although the FBI categorizes robbery as a violent offense, it is usually "instrumental" in nature. The distinction between instrumental and violent offenses may have implications for the effectiveness of deterrence efforts via Three Strikes laws: "instrumental" crimes may be deterred more readily not only because of the more "rational" nature of the offenses, but also because the marginal increases in sentence length are greatest for less-serious felonies that would carry the shortest sentences in the absence of Three Strikes.
Policy Variables
The primary independent variables of interest are those representing the presence of "Three Strikes and You're Out" laws. Additional attention is given in the model to California, which has an anomalous Three Strikes law, and to the state of Washington, which implemented Three Strikes earliest. Washington has one of the most widely implemented policies outside
California. The method of coding these policy interventions is explained in further detail below.
As a test of whether other policy changes deserve credit for changes in crime rates, a second policy intervention, Truth in Sentencing, is also included in the model. (Ditton & Wilson, 1999) . Because of the relative uniformity in TIS policies, California's Truth in Sentencing law is not expected to have effects on crime noticeably different from the effects of TIS policies in other states. In
Washington State, TIS with an 85 percent time-served requirement was adopted in 1990, three years before Three Strikes was passed; therefore, the effects of the two policies in Washington can be estimated using two separate independent variables.
Several control variables are included in the analyses, corresponding to factors that are believed to influence crime rates. These include measures of economic well-being (unemployment rate, poverty rate, and median household income), state and local government spending (percent of budget spent on police, corrections, and education), and demographic composition of the population (proportion of the population in several different age groups, percent African-American, and percent Hispanic).
Regression Model
The impacts of Three Strikes are empirically estimated in this paper using time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) analysis with fixed effects. This method can be applied when data are available for numerous observations over a series of points in time. TSCS analysis of state-level data is useful for the study of quasi-experiments like state-level policy interventions; it "provides control groups because the other 49 states act as controls when analyzing each individual state law, and permits one to enter a large number of control variables" (Marvell & Moody, 1996) .
Researchers can look for consistent effects of new legislation in states that have widely varying "starting points" in terms of existing crime rates and whose implementation of new laws occurred in several different years. Other benefits include substantial increases in sample size compared to panel data or time series only data, and therefore more degrees of freedom, which allows for inclusion of more control variables and improves the statistical efficiency of the estimates (Sayrs, 1989; Stimson, 1985) . The dependent variables (crime rates) are natural-logarithm transformed, for ease of interpretation, to approximate a normal distribution more closely, and to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
Findings and Discussion
The results of the regression analysis are shown in Table 2 below. For ease of presentation, coefficients corresponding to the individual year and state dummy variables are omitted from the table.
[ Table 2 about here]
Effects of Three Strikes on Different Crime Types in California vs. Other States
The analysis produces both expected and unexpected results with regard to the impacts of Three Strikes on crime rates. The coefficient associated with the crime trend in Three Strikes states after the law's adoption is negative and statistically significant for each of the "instrumental offenses": robbery, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft. The effects are not large, but they are consistent. Relative to the declines in crime already taking place nationwide and captured by the year fixed effects, the robbery rate in Three Strikes states fell 3 percent more rapidly, in the years after the law's adoption. The rate of burglary fell 1.8 percent more quickly, larceny-theft fell 1.1 percent faster, and motor vehicle theft fell 2 percent faster in Three Strikes states each year the law was in place. At first glance, this seems to support the hypothesis that policies intended to deter crime are most effective against offenses that are likely to involve premeditation or rational decision-making, as opposed to "crimes of passion."
However, the Three Strikes dummy variable, which is intended to capture deterrent effects, is associated with non-significant coefficients for every category of crime except murder. These findings are somewhat puzzling, particularly because nonviolent offenses like burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft are not eligible for sentencing under Three Strikes in most states, and therefore rates of those offenses would not be expected to decline as a result of Three Strikesrelated incapacitation effects.
In California, the coefficient on the Three Strikes dummy variable was negative and significant for two offenses: motor vehicle theft (β = -.328, p < .05) and robbery (β = -.271, p < .10), suggesting that some deterrent effects might exist with regard to these types of crime.
Contrary to expectations, although statistically significant crime-reduction effects on some crime types were found for Three Strikes policies nationwide, few additional incapacitation effects were measurable in California, the state in which the greatest deterrence and incapacitation effects would be expected. [ Table 3 about here]
An alternative explanation may be that a crime reduction effect does exist, but it cannot be measured with statistical significance in this analysis due to the limitations of the statistical tests used here. While the coefficient estimates associated with the California post-Three Strikes trend variables are not statistically significant, the analyses do produce consistently negative coefficients for every crime category except rape.
A noteworthy incidental finding from this analysis is that statistically significant and positive coefficients were found for the variable representing the crime trend in Three Strikes states before the adoption of the law for robbery, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. In other words, the states that passed Three Strikes laws did so as they were experiencing slower declines (compared to non-adopting states) in their rates of several crimes. This suggests that the desire to gain greater control over crime rates may have provided an impetus for legislatures or voters (through ballot initiatives) to support and enact "get tough" policies such as Three Strikes.
Another notable finding is that the Three Strikes dummy variable carries a positive and significant (p < .01) coefficient for only one category of crime, murder. Murder rates appear to have increased about 12.9 percent more rapidly (or fallen 12.9 percent less rapidly) in states with Three Strikes laws in place. This result is consistent, in both direction and magnitude, with the findings of some prior researchers (Kovandzic et al., 2002 (Kovandzic et al., , 2004 Marvell & Moody, 2001) , who have speculated that the fear of a long mandatory sentence may motivate some criminals to attempt to eliminate witnesses or resist law enforcement officers. It is surprising, however, that the effect is observed nationwide but is not especially pronounced in California, the state with the broadest and most highly publicized Three Strikes law.
Although skeptics might believe that many narrowly-drawn Three Strikes policies may have been designed to create the appearance of getting tough on crime while actually being applied to very few offenders, the results of the analysis suggest that some real effects may be observable. On the other hand, given the small number of criminals incarcerated under most Three Strikes laws, the crime effects in Three Strikes states other than California cannot be attributed entirely to the incapacitation of habitual offenders. There are two plausible alternative explanations. The laws may have had deterrent effects that somehow increased over time. This explanation is consistent with the finding that greater impacts were found for more readily deterred instrumental offenses, though it is unclear why the effects would grow over the years.
Another possibility is that one or more variables left out of the model are responsible. For example, the states that adopted Three Strikes may have enacted other crime prevention measures (other than Truth in Sentencing, which is included in the model) along with their Three Strikes policies.
Effects of Other Included Variables
The analysis indicates that Truth in Sentencing (TIS), another sentencing policy that gained popularity at about the same time as Three Strikes, had a far smaller impact on crime than Three Strikes. A statistically significant coefficient is associated with Truth in Sentencing adoption for only one offense category, burglary. There were no additional effects associated with TIS in Washington State or in California. The lack of observable effects of Truth in Sentencing is not very surprising, for a few reasons. TIS extends the length of existing sentences, rather than sending offenders to prison who otherwise would not have been incarcerated. The marginal incapacitation effects associated with TIS do not take effect until the end of the portion of the sentence that an inmate would already have served. TIS is targeted primarily toward violent criminals, though its scope is wider in some states. Finally, the distinction between TIS and non-TIS states is blurred by the fact that many states that did not meet the Department of Justice's 85 percent time served requirement for TIS funding nonetheless increased the proportion of time served by violent offenders (Turner et al., 2006) .
Economic factors influence the rates of some crimes, particularly instrumental offenses.
The unemployment rate has a positive and significant association with three types of crime, rape, robbery, and burglary. Consistent with criminal opportunity theory (higher rates of poverty mean fewer attractive targets), the proportion of state residents living in poverty has no effect on violent crime, but it is significantly and negatively associated with the rates of burglary and larceny. The proportion of state and local expenditures spent on corrections is associated with significant and negative coefficients for robbery and motor vehicle theft. The proportions spent on police and education have few significant effects.
The variable representing the percentage of the population that is African-American has a negative and significant coefficient in the models for rape, robbery, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft, indicating that the rates of these offenses are lower where the proportion of African-Americans in the population is higher, when other factors are controlled. Considering the vast literature on the relatively high rates of criminal offending and victimization among African-Americans, this outcome contradicts expectations. However, because this variable is relatively time-invariant within jurisdictions, the coefficient estimates associated with this variable in a fixed-effects model may be unstable (D. R. Johnson, 1995) . Due to immigration, the Hispanic proportion of the population has varied more than the African-American population over the time period included in the dataset. 18 This variable is associated with a positive coefficient in the models for burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. As one would expect, the percentage of the population in the most crime-prone age group, 18 to 24, is associated with higher levels of several offenses: murder, rape, burglary, and motor vehicle theft. observations support those of a previous study (Worrall, 2004) that also controlled for preexisting crime trends while using county, rather than state, data.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
"Three Strikes and You're Out" laws have been adopted by half of the American states, but California's policy is much broader than the corresponding habitual offender laws adopted elsewhere. While no other state has incarcerated more than 400 offenders under its Three Strikes law, over 100,000 convictions have resulted from California's policy. Yet, the approach taken in California has not been dramatically more effective at controlling crime than other states' efforts.
Some potential reasons for this finding were discussed above, but the question of why a law of this scale and scope has not had greater impacts on crime deserves further attention from researchers. More thorough analysis of factors that contribute to the policy adoption decision, using the passage of Three Strikes as a dependent variable, would be an interesting topic for future research. This paper's findings regarding Three Strikes' impacts in California may disappoint proponents of that state's approach to Three Strikes. It may, however, provide useful lessons for policymakers to consider in the future. One clear conclusion from the preceding analyses is that the "toughest" sentencing policy is not necessarily the most effective option. The narrowlyconstructed and seldom-used habitual offender policies adopted in many states appear to produce results comparable to those observed in California.
Policies like Three Strikes were not the only factors likely to have contributed to the decline in crime throughout the mid-to late 1990s. Other policy initiatives, which were not operationalized as control variables in the preceding analyses, have been credited with reducing crime as well. These include "zero tolerance" or "quality of life" policing strategies in New York City and other locations (Bratton, 1996; Katz, Webb, & Schaefer, 2001; Kelling & Bratton, 1988) , the passage of right-to-carry concealed weapons laws in several states (Lott, 1998; Lott & Mustard, 1997; McDonald, 1999; Plassmann & Tideman, 2001) , and many other efforts throughout the United States. Criminologists have also noted that the rise and fall of crack cocaine markets, and the gun violence directly and indirectly related to the drug trade, have coincided with trends in violent crime rates (Beres & Griffith, 1998; Blumstein & Rosenfeld, 1998; Bowling, 1999; Grogger, 2006; B. Johnson, Golub, & Dunlap, 2000; Wallman & Blumstein, 2005; Witkin, 1998) . It is possible that the reductions in crime experienced throughout the United States from the early 1990s through the early 2000s resulted from many different forces, including Three Strikes laws in some states, and other, contemporaneous, policy changes in other places.
Some scholars believe that these changes in crime rates can hardly be explained at all. It has been suggested that recent drops in crime in many American cities should primarily be attributed to "regression to the mean" from preceding periods of rapid growth that reached unusually high peaks (Fagan, Zimring, and Kim, 1998 Pennsylvania and most other states). He explains that a narrow law is likely to be more costeffective, as it will target high-rate offenders to serve the longest sentences; on the other hand, a broad law should be expected to have a bigger impact on crime, but at a far higher cost per crime averted (Caulkins, 2001) . To an extent, the results presented above confirm this expectation. In allowing felony offenses that are neither serious nor violent to trigger second-and third-strike sentences, California's policy seems to extend beyond the point of diminishing marginal returns.
Narrowly-constructed laws, such as those in most other states, appear to be associated with slight crime reduction effects for certain categories of offenses, but the additional crime-reducing benefits of California's far broader policy are small or nonexistent for nearly every category of crime, while the costs associated with this extra breadth are considerable.
The law has led to less growth in California's prison population than some initial forecasts predicted (see, for example, Greenwood et al. 1994 Three Strikes is one of numerous "get-tough" policies adopted throughout the United
States in response to concerns about rising crime rates in the 1990s. The evidence presented above indicates that the presence of a Three Strikes law is associated with modest crime reduction effects nationally, and that California's version of the law is not considerably more effective at crime reduction than alternative methods that are narrower in scope. Regardless of its limited effects on crime, however, California's Three Strikes policy will continue to produce tremendous and lasting ramifications for prison population growth, state budgets, and tens of thousands of human lives, unless the state's voters decide to reduce the scope of the law at some point in the future. 
